'It is to those periods of "special grievance", marked by waves of strikes and industrial conflict, that socialists must look for the seeds of radicalisation' (John Kelly, Trade Unions and Socialist Politics, p. 304). What evidence is there for such a link? Illustrate your answer by evidence from the industrial disputes of 1978-1979.
'What we see today is a set of effective rank-and-file strike tactics being militantly applied by one group of workers after another, for objects which, even by the criterion of "trade union consciousness" are rather narrow.'
This essay explores the alleged links between industrial militancy and class consciousness in relation to the industrial disputes of 1978 – 1979, a renowned period in British history infamously immortalised as the 'winter of discontent' the then editor of The Sun Larry Lamb. The impact of strikes on class consciousness has fuelled widespread debate since the waves of industrial unrest of 1968 – 1974 and 1977 – 1979. This debate was precipitated by Eric Hobsbawm's Marx Memorial Lecture of 1978, which launched a fierce critique on what he saw as the sectionalist and economistic militancy of the British working class and its declining political consciousness. The issue at stake was whether strike waves could radicalise workers, even though the strikes that composed them were fought over traditional economic demands. The 'winter of discontent' is widely regarded as epitomising Hobsbawm's view, the antithesis of the 'class radicalisation' thesis, exposing the sectionalism of industrial action and the dividing affects of a purely economistic militancy on the working class. Thus, when people think of the 'winter of discontent', they immediately conjure up images of mile-high piles of rubbish in Leicester square swarming with rats and newspaper headlines that read 'They Won't Even Let Us Bury Our Dead'. 'Britain was under siege'. This is the ideal construct that British capital would have us remember, the allegedly destructive consequences of strikes and industrial action. Of course, this construct is a complete fallacy. The stark truth remains that the 'winter of discontent' was another victory for the working class on it 'forward march': a working class that inflicted the most decisive defeat for any Labour government at the hands of the class struggle, a working class which had deposed of two consecutive governments', a working class whose struggle culminated in Thatcherism. Undoubtedly Thatcherism was the result of the working class. However, contrary to public opinion it was the result of working class success, not failure. It is my contention that the 'winter of discontent' was a victory for the proletariat, a victory which, in the lap of the capitalist class, Thatcher unmercifully reversed. Thus, this work will attempt to propose a countervailing interpretation, the antithesis, which regards the 'winter of discontent' as the culmination of over a decade of class struggle forcing the capitalist class to launch direct reprisals on the working class through Margaret Thatcher. If ever there was a period of "special grievance" that contained the seeds of class radicalisation, it was the turbulent months of the 'winter of discontent' when trade unionists came to the realisation that the Social Contract between themselves and the labour Government had under Callaghan become 'little more than a euphemism for voluntary and subsequently statutory wage restraint.' Thus, if the alleged links between industrial militancy and class consciousness do exist then presumably they can be identified in the 'winter of discontent' that saw workers pitted in struggle against their employers, their union bureaucracy and their allegedly representative Labour Government: the government's five percent wage increase was, due to inflation and the cost of living, in reality almost a five percent wage cut. Indeed it could be argued that the corporate State's apparent bias towards employers – however misconstrued and superficial – could have politicised a struggle that may have begun with wage demands, but through state intervention escalated into a political struggle. The 'winter of discontent' may be regarded, and superficially appear an example, of defensive economistic militancy, what Lenin refers to as the 'bourgeois politics of the working class', however this assumption must be explored. It cannot be accepted without critical analysis, which is so often the case.
Firstly this work highlights the main theoretical approaches utilised in relation to class consciousness and industrial militancy – those of Luxemburg and Hobsbawm – then it analyses the events of the 'winter of discontent' and attempts to isolate which theory, if any, is most suitable and if there were any links between the allegedly sectional and economistic militancy of 1978 – 1979 and class consciousness. Finally, it concludes as to whether those events could have been harnessed by socialists to radicalise English society. It is apparent that contrary to Hobsbawm's theory and other Leninist approaches, 'trade union consciousness' is a key component in the heightening of political class consciousness, through which trade unions mobilise the working class. However to be truly radicalised periods of 'special grievance', as all Marxists will agree, require a mass socialist party. The seeds of radicalisation were apparent during the 'winter of discontent' as was rank-and-file determinism. But, the party was missing: an effective elite of committed political activists who could exploit those radicalised seeds forcing their germination culminating in the emergence of a socialist society.
Perhaps the most influential and well known of theoretical approaches to the dynamic of class consciousness is that of Rosa Luxemburg. For Luxemburg 'it is the scale of strikes, and the response of the State, not the initial demands of the strikers, that are crucial for understanding the link between strikes and consciousness.' Militancy that is initially economistic can become politicised depending on the situation and certain factors, most notably for Luxemburg the intervention of the state. Under capitalism economic and political struggles are often separated and channelled into the reformatory and safe channels of parliament, thus depoliticising trade union struggle. Luxemburg asserted that these political and economic struggles, of necessity, had to be inextricably intertwined for the class consciousness of workers to be increased. She stated,
(t)he workers' condition of ceaseless economic struggle with the capitalists keeps their fighting energy alive in every political interval; it forms, so to speak the permanent fresh reservoir of the strength of the proletarian classes, from which the political fight ever renews its strength and at the same time leads the indefatigable economic sappers of the proletariat at all times, now here and now there, to isolated sharp conflicts, out of which political conflicts on a large scale unexpectedly explode.
Hence Luxemburg viewed the political and economic strikes in times of revolution as mutually dependent and interconnected. According to Luxemburg, it is this interconnection that allegedly makes the effectively mass strike or strike wave. As Kelly correctly posits, the strike was for Luxemburg politicised through two methods; either it was used for directly political purposes, or the economic struggles spearheaded by mass strikes acquired a political character. This link between the political and economic struggle that Luxemburg cited suggests there may well be a link between industrial militancy and class consciousness: however, we must remember that this is also dependent on the revolutionary situation that may not have existed during the 'winter of discontent'. Even though this revolutionary situation is a requirement for the effectiveness of the mass strike/strike wave, we cannot ignore that Luxemburg asserted there must be complete unity between the 'two organizations of the labor movement, the Social Democracy and the trade unions'. As Luxemburg succinctly posited,
There are no two different class struggles of the working class, an economic and a political one, but only one class struggle, which aims at one and the same limitation of capitalist exploitation within bourgeois society, and at the abolition of exploitation together with bourgeois society itself.
Admittedly during the 'winter of discontent' the gap between the policies and opinions of the Labour party and those of the rank-and-file represented a gaping chasm that saw the Labour leaders' and their policies seemingly affiliated with capital, pitted against the people they should have represented. Hoggart and Leigh show there was a real dichotomy between the policies of the Labour party and the opinion of the rank-and-file: 'It is an indication of the way in which Foot and Callaghan had allowed themselves to become isolated from the real world that they failed to foresee the failure of the five percent policy.' However we should not dwell too long here on how effectively the 'winter of discontent' can be explained by Luxemburg's theory as this shall be dealt with later in the work.
Luxemburg, like Lenin, asserted that trade unions could make only a limited impact on workers' conditions under capitalism without the influence of a revolutionary party. She also agreed with Lenin that the 'mass strike' was one of the most effective means of bringing masses into struggle and heightening their political consciousness. Luxemburg stated that a general strike or a strike wave constituted a mass strike only in times of revolutionary struggle outside of which the character of the strike(s) would be more limited and quite probably sectional, not unifying the working class behind a common ideology. The role of the state in industrial disputes was singled out by Luxemburg as the main factor in politicising wage struggles. State intervention in strikes brought workers and their unions into conflict with the state, posing the question of who was to rule society. It also heightened worker consciousness by revealing the bias of the state. Luxemburg saw state intervention as crucial in polarising society around those for and against strikers, those who backed labour and those who supported capital. As Kelly states, 'In other words politics and political struggle came to be dominated by temporarily but overwhelmingly by the reality of class. In this situation sectional outlooks by groups of workers were likely to be transcended, and submerged in a class-wide identity. Coupled with the propaganda of the revolutionary party, strikes which began over simple wage issues would develop into political struggles as the workers' sense of the proletariat as a class-for-itself heightened and increased the class consciousness of that group as a whole. Although it has its limits, Luxemburg's analysis of the dynamics of class consciousness undoubtedly remains the most influential Marxist work on class consciousness.
Another of the most prominent analyses of industrial militancy and its effect on class consciousness is that of Hobsbawm, particularly in his work The Forward March of Labour Halted? and to a lesser extent his Worlds of Labour, in which he stressed that the militancy of the English working class from the 1950s has been of a purely economistic and sectional character. Hobsbawm condemned the selfishness of this economistic militancy when he suggested that,
The strength of strikes today, particularly in the public sector where the market and profits are not the determinants, rests largely on the ability to put political pressure on the government by the ability to make life difficult for the public including all non-striking workers.
Hobsbawm saw this sectionalism and selfishness as inherent within purely economistic militancy undermining the consciousness which workers' derived form other forms of trade union struggle. Within wage struggles workers' have no real sense of their collective nature, they become ignorant of their ability to be a class of workers 'for itself'. He suggested, 'In fact, and in contrast to both the classical syndicalist era and the general tendency of strikes for a good deal of this century, the great strike movements of the 1970s are overwhelmingly economic in the narrowest sense.' Hobsbawm then believed that there was no politicisation inherent in the strikers' actions. They were striking for purely materialistic meas. These workers did not think economistic militancy could produce a politicisation of the struggle and what is more, according to Hobsbawm, they did not care. 'The logic of Hobsbawm's critique of section wage struggle was that if trade union action was engaged in by a wider range of forces and directed towards non-wage objectives then it would be more likely to generate class consciousness.'
By analysing certain statistics such as trade union membership, party membership and voting patterns, Hobsbawm concluded that union density was barely higher than in 1945, and 'the number and proportion of the electorate voting Labour had declined at almost every election since 1951.' He stated, 'in absolute figures Labour (plus Communist) after 1951 barely ever got to within one million of its then vote, and in 1974 it polled about 2 and a half million less than in 1951, less than in any election since 1935.' The statistics suggested that while the number of strikes was reaching a high for the twentieth century, the militancy was of an economistic and sectional character, concerned merely with wages. Hobsbawm's theory is extremely simplistic and designed to fit his Marx Memorial Lecture as laid out in The Forward March of Labour Halted?. Over the years he revised it significantly, the primary consideration being to show how economic struggle could in some instances heighten class consciousness. However for the purpose of this work we shall utilise the theory in its most simplistic, unrevised form. We shall now briefly account for some important statistics in relation to trade unionism and 1979.
Steve Jefferys has quite astutely shown that many of the indicators Hobsbawm used to substantiate his thesis on the forward march of labour were flawed. He suggests,
While there has been a massive structural shift away from the traditional manual working-class occupations … trade union consciousness has been more widespread in the 1970s than fifteen or thirty years ago. Women and black workers have been recruited to trade unionism at a faster rate than their white male counterparts, and have strengthened rather than weakened "class solidarity".
So within the trade unions the statistics do not paint the declining picture of the state of the labour movement as Hobsbawm suggests. The unions were in a strong position reaffirming 'class solidarity'. By 1979 trade unions and their rank-and-file members were situated in a better position than ever before, unions were 'as never before at the heart of popular culture and discourse.' Total union membership had reached 13.5 million by 1979, with trade unionists comprising 55 percent of the labour force. In 1979 more than 29 million working days were lost, the fifth largest figure of the twentieth century. Trade unions and their rank-and-file were enjoying the fruits of successful and determined collective bargaining. Unions played, unlike today, a crucial and respected part in the governance of society.
We shall now assess whether the events of the 'winter of discontent' did heighten class consciousness. To do this we shall concentrate on three crucial components of the 'winter of discontent'. Firstly, the Ford's strike of 1978, the Road Haulage dispute of 1979 and finally, the infamous events of the public service workers' strike that has inflicted such a damning reputation upon the events of 1978 – 1979. The reader should be aware that literature on these respective strikes, the most important of the 'winter of discontent', is extremely limited and in some cases non-existent. This has constrained the following analyses.
The path to defeat for the Callaghan Government was completely laid by November 1978. in October the Labour Party conference voted by 4 million to 1.9 million to reject the five percent policy. The in November 1978 the workers of the Ford Motor Company ended their nine week strike with a pay rise of 16.5 percent consisting of a 9.5 percent rise of their basic rate, a 2 percent rise in holiday pay and a 5 percent attendance allowance. Whether it was a wildcat strike or not the Ford industrial action quickly gained the support of all Ford workers against what Ron Todd called the company's 'derisory' offer. The rank-and-file – partly motivated by shop stewards, partly spontaneously – began to actively support their demands in Halewood and Southampton on 21st September 1978, and by the 26th, 57000 Ford workers collectively stopped work. The Ford strike was characterised by massive solidarity, so much so that picket lines and coercive persuasion were not required, hardly anybody contemplated entering the factories. Neither were 'flying pickets' necessary, the active solidarity of the English proletariat blocked all movement of the required components both on the roads and at the docks. Indeed, even the wives of Ford workers' asserted, 'We Ford wives are a hundred percent with the strikers.' The Ford strike is crucial as it could have only have reached the levels of success it did through a complete ignorance or rejection of 'capitalist values', an ignorance producing a solidarity and cohesion otherwise unthinkable. The result of the Ford strike saw the 'awful' Government isolated from both the workers it was meant to represent and the capitalists whom its policies had seemingly benefited. The workers had been pitted in struggle against their employers and their government, and had emerged victorious. Thus, the confidence of the working class was massively enhanced by the Ford strike and such direct struggle between workers' and the Government brought about a mood of radicalisation that spurred on trade unionists throughout the 'winter of discontent'. It was the 1978 Ford strike which ensured there would be a real showdown between the Labour Government and the working class. As Ken Gill suggested, this was a political struggle:
It was precisely during the 60s and 70s period of mass political struggle, when "wage militancy" was at its peak, that the ruling class tried a final solution of the trade union question. There is a clear link between struggle and political change. The fact is that wage struggles are no longer pure wage struggles.
Of central importance here of course is the last sentence, which shows that the increasingly meddling role of a right wing government in workplace affairs served to politicise wage militancy. This was precisely what happened in those turbulent events of 1978-9. It would seem that, as Luxemburg suggested, state intervention here politicised a wage struggle.
The next major event of the 'winter of discontent' was the road haulage dispute where once again the government capitulated to the working class. On January 4th, tanker drivers belonging to British Petroleum and Texaco began a complete fuel strike. By January 8th 13-15 percent wage increases had been accepted but the Texaco drivers continued with their strike. They arranged 'flying pickets' to the depots of other companies who had returned to work. Closely intertwined with the lorry drivers' dispute was that of the truck drivers, which was seen as the second most brutal strike of the period. The enduring legacy of that strike was of 'bearded men in duffle coats huddled around braziers.' Although the expected shortages never materialised during the road haulage dispute, there is not question that the failure of the Labour Government was measured against the appearance of Britain under siege. As Healey suggested, 'Nervous viewers thought the Revolution had already begun.' The various drivers' disputes saw Government intervention again politicising what may have started out as pure 'wage militancy'. Government – particularly Home Secretary Merlyn Rees – questioning the legality of 'flying pickets' ensured the lorry and truck drivers' disputes had political affects. There were problems with the legality of the flying pickets in the lorry drivers' disputes, and such issues did arise in the hire and reward road haulage dispute of 1979. However, as Smith suggests,
The solidarity that characterized road haulage trade-unionism in the major industrial centres made it unnecessary to organize pickets at strikers' depots, and as the dispute rapidly acquired a national dimension it also proved unnecessary to travel to other areas to extend support.
Within the union then, solidarity dictated that pickets at strikers' depots were not necessary. Workers' knew their collective action was influential, they held optimistic views that the strike would be resolved with a successful outcome. This belief in the strength of workers' collective action may not have had politicising effects, but it was tantamount to an increase in class consciousness, even if it was only a consciousness of the proletariat as a 'class-in-itself'. A belief in collective action breeds a belief in the group, the collective. This sense of collectiveness is a form of class consciousness, whether it is a political consciousness or not is irrelevant. Politicisation can come from a group of committed revolutionaries it does not have to come from striking workers. It is the job of these revolutionaries to harness the class consciousness of workers and transform it into what Gramsci called a 'hegemonic consciousness'.
Where pickets were stationed – docks, container bases, rail terminals, wholesale markets, cold stores, supermarkets and roads – only a handful of strikers were required and they relied on moral argument to persuade people not to cross the pickets. Another example of solidarity among the striking workers' can be seen through the support lent to the road haulage hire and reward strikers by drivers, dockers and manufacturing workers who took part in blacking. For almost a month – particularly on the motorways, in the ports and the factories – it was clear that the lorry drivers and their strikers' committees were the law, and not the unions, the State, or the Althusserian Repressive State Apparatus' such as the police. When many of the lorry drivers had resumed work (approximately 2nd February), in some cases they had received pay rises as high as 22 percent. Once again the five percent policy had been smashed and, for a time, law and order had been administered by a gang of drivers. Whether or not radicalisation was apparent, the seeds for that radicalisation had definitely been planted. This may have been a purely economistic struggle however the success of this collective action inspired a class consciousness that could quite possibly have been turned into a political class consciousness if the 'right' political guidance had been offered. Indeed, the strikers might have developed a political class consciousness had the environment been more akin to the revolutionary situation described by Luxemburg. The militancy displayed here was purely economistic – although it did have political repercussions as can be seen by the issues of legality surrounding 'secondary action' and 'secondary picketing' – yet it was not sectional as Hobsbawm probably would have posited: solidarity among striking workers, all members of the working class, was too widespread for sectionalism to have been present. In this instance then, the dynamics of class consciousness and industrial action cannot be completely explained either by Hobsbawm's theory, or Luxemburg's. The events of the hire and reward road haulage dispute sit uneasily between these two prominent theories.
Finally we shall analyse the heart of the 'winter of discontent', the public services disputes that bore witness to the most infamous events of 1978 – 1979. The public services disputes began on 22nd January and lasted on and off for approximately six weeks. 'For the first and only time the Government activated its own machinery for crisis management through the Regional Emergency Committees.' On the public sector workers' day of action 1.5 million workers' were called out in opposition to the Government's five percent pay ceiling. Those workers infamously included gravediggers, refuse collectors, hospital workers, school caretakers and airport staff. The four unions involved – National Union of Public Employees (NUPE), General and Municipal Workers' Union (GMWU), Confederation of Health Service Employees (COHSE) and Transport and General Workers' Union (TGWU) – demanded a £60 minimum wage and a 35 hour working week.
One factor in these disputes that does suggest some form of class consciousness was the awareness of the workers that the structure of modern capitalism enabled them, through strike action, to completely paralyse the apparatus of production. Dave Walton suggests there was a widespread refusal of capitalist ideology by the public service workers. Walton sums this rejection up as, 'I don't want to do this because I want to do something else.' In other words, the capitalist values of voluntary cooperation were overturned by the selfishness of the workers who had no interest in the exploitative firms for which they worked. This seems to be a peculiar reversal of the charge of sectional proposed by Hobsbawm. Walton sees this sectionalism as becoming the unifying factor of the working class in their struggle with the Labour Government. This militant 'acting for oneself' came before any other consideration, including those of employers. In other words, trade unions and their bureaucracies were subverted by their rank-and-file whose discontent with Labour's policies meant that all Labour affiliates were viewed suspiciously. The trade union apparatus, normally so favourable to capitalism, was during the public services' strike hijacked by the rank-and-file leaving union bosses helpless in the face of this peculiar proletarian militancy. Of course this militancy did start out as purely economistic yet we must not forget that it was aimed directly at the state, which does suggest some form of politicisation was involved. When such an action is aimed directly at another group or class, class solidarity tends to be reaffirmed. However, it is interesting that within the public sector disputes, a strange number of Conservative trade unionists were present, particularly among hospital staff. Chris Powell's film 'The Winter of Discontent' paints a picture of Jamie Morris, a Conservative trade unionist based at Westminster Hospital, who said it was better to have a bad Conservative government than a bad (or good) socialist government. This trade unionist actually campaigned to bring Margaret Thatcher into power, and surprisingly his political stance was not as far removed from the rest of the public sector strikers' as we would like to believe.
However this is counterbalanced by the political viewpoints of one major union, NUPE, and the views of its officials and representatives. NUPE, led by Alan Fisher and Bernie Dix, was a brash leftist union that unlike other unions recruited many of its officers from the radical left. However, due to its militant tradition and radical politics, NUPE was ostracised by the other main unions and its leader Fisher was constantly denied a place on the TUC General Council. Its presence however helped consolidate the feelings of those public sector workers paid minimal wages for difficult and dirty jobs. Although the most brutal, and the most enduring in the public consciousness, the public sector disputes were perhaps the most uneventful of the period in terms of class consciousness. Many of the workers involved seemed to have had no interest in politics which is unsurprising when they were paid such pittance. The only concern they probably will have had much time for was feeding their families. Class consciousness does not seem to have been affected by the public sector disputes. Indeed, developments in class consciousness seem to have been more in line with Hobsbawm's theory of sectionalism and economist militancy than with Luxemburg's theory of politicisation. Activists within the trade unions, such as Jamie Morris, were working to undermine the Labour movement rather than further the cause of socialism.
If the 'winter of discontent' did not directly heighten working class consciousness then it can certainly be seen as contributing to the radicalisation of the Labour Party and strengthening the left within the party. The left united behind accountability of the leader and party, which contributed to a leftist manifesto spearheaded by stalwarts of the left such as Benn and to a lesser extent Foot. After the 'winter of discontent' Foot became leader of the party and Benn narrowly missed being elected as deputy leader. The party was again becoming, although rife with factionalism, a party for the workers', which it had not been under Callaghan. With hindsight, Callaghan's government indicates that New Labour is not a new aberration. The internal party reform striven for after the events of 1978-79 under the auspices of the Rank and File Mobilising Committee show that the left may have been frustrated, yet leftward momentum continued within the Labour Party. Indeed, regionally the labour movement was gaining momentum. In Liverpool Trotskyists backed by Militant began to exert their influence. In 1978 Derek Hatton stood in the Tuebrook ward of Liverpool and was able to increase the Labour vote by a staggering 50 percent, despite not being elected. After the 'winter of discontent' Hatton was elected. Such gains were made by the labour movement throughout the country. The Labour Party may have lost the 1979 election and lost some support, yet this was support that had voted for Callaghan, a right wing choice for Prime Minister. Once Labour moved back towards the left it was inevitable that some of these right wing supporters would swing towards the Conservatives and the Thatcherite counterrevolution.
This work has attempted to explore a countervailing interpretation to that proposed by Hobsbawm of sectionalism and pure wage militancy in relation to the 'winter of discontent'. This has proven an incredibly difficult task, the orthodoxy of sectionalism and pure wage militancy ringing true for most of the events. However, there were some examples of solidarity that lend hope to the notion that class consciousness was to an extent increased. Still I can see no real correlation between the 'winter of discontent' and class consciousness, either an increase or decrease. In terms of the theorists, Luxemburg seems to be most appealing, although her theory does not hold true when applied to the events of 1978-79. Hobsbawm's theory seems too rigid and inflexible whereas Luxemburg allows for external factors in the heightening of class consciousness through industrial action. To conclude then, class consciousness can be divorced from industrial action in the 'winter of discontent', no real links are apparent. However, it seems that industrial action can do more good than harm for class consciousness, so Hobsbawm's theory is flawed. Although I see no real links between class consciousness and industrial militancy it still seems that the 'winter of discontent' was not the reason for the election of Margaret Thatcher. The real reason behind her election was a right wing government who could not decide whether to side with labour or capital, sitting uneasily between the two thus alienating itself from both.